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Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in
Louisiana
Albert Tate, Jr.*
It is sometimes stated that, in deciding legal disputes, a
judge merely finds the correct law and applies it to the facts
of the case in controversy. It is my intention to discuss here
some of the techniques available to a Louisiana judge to "find
the law" by which to decide the case, once the facts are estab-
lished.
We must, preliminarily, make brief mention of the legal
system under which a Louisiana judge works. Although this
has been disputed in modern times,' scholars now generally
agree that Louisiana is still a civil law jurisdiction, but with
substantial infusions of common law concepts and techniques.2
For present purposes, what this essentially means is that the
primary basis of law for a civilian is legislation, and not (as in
the common law) a great body of tradition in the form of prior
decisions of the courts.3 In important respects, the statutory
*Judge, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The substance of these remarks was
delivered before the student body of the Louisiana State University Law School
on March 19, 1962, as part of the Law School's 1961-1962 Law Lecture Series.
1. See, e.g., Crabites, Louisiana Not a Civil Law State, 9 LOYOLA L. J. 51
(1928); Greenburg, Must Louisiana Resign to the Common Law?, 11 TUL. L.
REV. 598 (1937) ; Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TVL. L. REV.
585 (1937).
2. Baudoin, The Influence of the Code Napoleon, 33 Tu:L. L. REV. 21 (1958);
Brosman, A Controversy and a Challenge, 12 TUL. L. REV. 239 (1938) ; Daggett,
Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law
of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937) ; Hood, A Crossroad in Louisiana His-
tory, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 709 (1962) ; Jolowicz, The Civil Law in Lou-
isiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 491 (1955) ; Pope, How Real Is the Difference Today
Between the Law of Louisiana and that of the other 47 States?, 17 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 186 (1949) ; Tucker, The Code and the Common Law in Louisiana, 29
TiL. L. REV. 739 (1955) ; Tullis, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 12
TuL. L. REV. 113 (1937).
3. These and other generalizations concerning the civil and the common law
are based upon general readings, including, besides the authorities cited in notes
1 and 2 supra: LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CML LAW (1956) ;
SCHWARTZ, THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD (1956) ; Dainow,
Z2he Constitutional and Judicial Organization of France and Germany and some
Comparisons of the Civil Law and Common Law Systems, 37 IND. L.J. 1
(1961) ; Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine,
and Precedent in French Law, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 235 (1958) ; Morrow,
Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for State and Nation,
17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 537 (1943) ; Rheinstein, Common Law and Civil Law: An
Elementary Comparison, 22 REVISTA JUaRDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO
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sources are synthesized in a code which provides an integrated
system of general principles governing much of the civil relation-
ships of men among themselves and with regard to their prop-
erty.
We will concentrate our attention on the part played in the
decisional processes by the principal formal sources used by a
Louisiana judge in adjudicating the disputes presented to him,
namely:
1. The Civil Code and the statutes;
2. Doctrine;
3. Precedents.4
In conventional civilian thought, the first, as expressions
of the legislative will, are regarded as the authoritative sources
of the law. The latter two sources are regarded merely as inter-
pretations of, or as persuasive sources of, the law, which itself
is embodied only in legislation. The Louisiana judge must, as
stated, find primarily in legislative enactments the legal prin-
ciples to be applied in deciding the case before him.
I. THE CIVIL CODE AND THE STATUTES
Our Civil Code is a comprehensive, systematic, and coherent
enactment regulating most of the area of private law- the
family, successions, ownership, and most contracts. Although
sometimes containing detailed regulation when certainty is nec-
essary, such as in testamentary dispositions, ordinarily the code
concepts are set forth as general principles. These general prin-
ciples are to be applied to particular fact situations by the use
of deduction, analogy, and other processes of logic. The Code is
supposed to be a self-sufficient and logically interdependent en-
actment, to be construed as a whole, and to regulate entirely
the relationships and incidents within its scope without refer-
ence to other authoritative sources of law.
The importance of the Civil Code in the regulation of our
private law is not to be estimated by the comparative brevity
of its text. It consists of less than four thousand articles, easily
Rico 70 (1953) ; von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and in
France, 22 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 235 (1953).
4. For reasons of brevity, and because they are used with relative infrequency
in deciding civil litigation in our state courts, we will omit discussion of two
other sources of law sometimes applicable to the dispute, (a) constitutional pro-
visions and (b) custom. As to the latter, see, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3 (1870) :
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contained in a normal-sized volume, as compared with the five
bulky volumes containing the text of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950. In general, the fifty-six titles of these latter
statutes are intended to be a consolidation of all the miscel-
laneous non-related general statutory enactments passed over
the years. Although the provisions and subjects in the Civil
Code are small in number compared to those contained in the
statutes, the scope of code regulation includes the major areas
of private law important to the ordinary life of the average
citizen- as mentioned, including family law, successions, the
ownership and transfer of property, and most contractual re-
lationships. The provisions of the Revised Statutes, on the other
hand, usually regulate more specialized areas, such as workmen's
compensation or chattel mortgages or criminal law and pro-
cedure.
As we have stated, in civilian theory it is primarily in these
statutory sources - the Civil Code and other legislation - that
the judge must find the legal precept applicable to the dispute
before him. We will speak of "interpretation" in this paper as
the judge's work in determining the general legal principle to
apply to the decision of the particular case, and in determining
the manner in which the principle will be applied so as to decide
the dispute.
In most conflicts of interest, the statutory enactments pro-
vide reasonably clear guidance as to what are the legal precepts
intended to govern the present conflict of interest between the
parties. There is little value in extended discussion of the some-
times somewhat mechanical function of a court to apply plain
code or statutory provisions to subjects clearly intended to be
regulated by them; for example, such as the requirement that
transfers of immovable property be in writing on pain of nullity
otherwise.5 As our Civil Code provides, "When a law is clear
"Customs result from a long series of actions constantly repeated, which have by
such repetition, and by uninterrupted acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit
and common consent," and annotations thereunder in 1 WEST'S LSA-CIVIL CODE
218 et seq. (1952). See also I PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) §§ 11, 14 (1959) ; CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 58-65 (1921) ; Loussouarn, The Relative Importance
of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and Precedent in French Law, 18 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 235, 247-54 (1958).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2440, 2275 (1870). Hereinafter, references to articles
in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 will simply be by article number, without
further identification.
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and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be dis-
regarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."6
But there are other instances where the correct legal precept
to apply is not easy to ascertain.
The very circumstance that there is litigation may mean
that the words of the statutory source are ambiguous and do
not clearly indicate the intended effect insofar as resolution of
the present conflict is concerned. There may be two or more
competing and conflicting legislative principles either of which,
it may be argued with seemingly equal reason, are applicable
to the present facts, even though producing opposite decisional
results. The present legal dispute may involve a factual situation
apparently unforeseen by the legislators and to which none of
the legislative enactments seem directly applicable. Although
the words of the statute may be clear and unambiguous, apply-
ing them to the facts of the present case may produce a result so
unreasonable or so seemingly unfair as to suggest that the legis-
lature never intended for the enactment in question to be applied
to the present type of fact situation.
What is the judge to do in such a situation? What techniques
must be utilized to determine the legal principles applicable?
I do not here mean to speak of various technical rules of con-
struction which are available as an aid in the interpretation of
statutes. Our Civil Code, for instance, lists a few, including:
language must be understood in its general and popular sense,
unless terms of art or technical terms are used, which latter must
be accorded their received technical meaning; where the words
are ambiguous, the meaning of the law must be sought by exam-
ining the context within which they are used, or by construing
laws in pari materia (that is, upon the same subject matter)
with reference to one another.7 Likewise, the Louisiana Revised
Statutes contain some introductory general provisions setting
forth certain specific rules of construction to aid in the inter-
pretation of the text of this enactment,8 and various decisions of
the Louisiana courts have established several principles of inter-
preting the meaning of the Revised Statutes with relation to the
earlier enactments consolidated in them.9 Again, Planiol sets
6. Article 13.
7 Articles 13-21.
8. LA. R.S. 1:1-17 (1950).
9. The principles of interpretation of the Louisiana Revised Statutes enunciated
in decisions of the courts are of some interest. A provision of general interpreta-
[Vol. XXII
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forth accepted rules and devices of construction in the differing
situations (a) where the text is clear but its application doubt-
ful, (b) where the meaning of the text is doubtful, (c) where the
law is silent, or (d) where there is a conflict between two legis-
lative texts."'
To narrow our inquiry somewhat, we will not discuss methods
of interpretation which are based upon logical analysis of the
legislative enactments available for the decision of the matter -
what the French call the exegetical approach to interpretation,
one based only upon the statutory text itself. We will instead
concentrate our attention upon the general approach of the judge
and the techniques of interpretation used by him when by exege-
sis the statutory enactments themselves do not provide a defini-
tive guide to the correct principle of law to apply to the dispute.
In this difficulty, when by use of the orthodox rules of con-
struction and methods of analysis the judge is unable with satis-
fying certainty to determine the statutory enactment's applica-
tion to the present dispute, a threshold problem often is to de-
termine whether the concrete conflict of interest to be decided
was intended to be regulated by the legal precept in question,
which resolves in the abstract conflicts between interests based
upon certain notions of policy which underlie and justify the
precept." An interesting related threshold problem is the con-
tion enacted as part of the text provides that the Revised Statutes "shall be con-
strued as continuations of and as substitutes for" the laws which were revised
and consolidated. Id. 1:16. Where the text of the former law was changed and
the present revised provision is clear and unambiguous, the courts have held that
the unambiguous text of the Revised Statutes should 'be interpreted according to
its clear meaning, without reference to the prior law - that is, it is held that
the revision changed rather than merely clarified or codified the prior law. Bel v.
Van Kuren, 236 La. 23, 106 So. 2d 703 (1958) ; City of Alexandria v. LaCombe,
220 La. 618, 57 So.2d 206 (1952) ; Note, 15 LouisIANA LAW REVIEW 472 (1955).
See also LA. R.S. 1:4 (1950). But where the provisions of the revised text are
ambiguous, to find their meaning the courts refer to the prior laws consolidated
and codified by the revised text; in this event, then the presumption is applied
that the legislature intended generally only to codify and continue the meaning
of the prior enactments as previously interpreted by the courts. Gay v. United
Benefit Life Insurance Co., 233 La. 226, 96 So. 2d 497 (1957) ; State v. Texas
Gas Transmission Corp., 128 So.2d 849 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), affirmed, 136
So.2d 55 (La. 1961) ; Perkins v. Brothers of Christian Schools, 71 So.2d 400 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1954). Also, with the civilian (and perhaps universal) penchant
for synthesis and unification of the law, there are expressions in our jurisprudence
that the Revised Statutes should be regarded as a single enactment adopted as a
whole, so that all provisions should be construed together and reconciled whenever
possible as simultaneous expressions of the legislative will. Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Olvey, 238 La. 980, 117 So.2d 563 (1960), and cases cited therein.
But see LA. R.S. 1:12 (1950).
10. 1 PLANIOL, CrvIL LAW TREATISE (TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE) §§ 202-207, 215-225 (1959).
11. von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and in France, 22
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sideration of whether the legislature intended the precept in
question to be an immutable rule to be applied without variation
or exception (as is generally the case for instance with enact-
ments affecting title to land) no matter how inequitable the re-
sult, or whether instead the legislative precept was more in the
nature of a standard, permitting some discretionary individuali-
zation of application by the courts in order to achieve the general
aim of the statute in consonance with general principles of fair-
ness, or whether instead the enactment was intended to furnish
a principle to be classified somewhere between the immutable
rule and the general standard insofar as preventing or permit-
ting judicial discretion in its application. 12
After determining that the enactment in question was intend-
ed to regulate this particular type of conflict of interest, the court
must apply it, as has often been stated, according to the legisla-
tive intent expressed by the enactment. However, the approach
of the court is often not so much to find the specific personal in-
tent of the legislators who enacted the law; it is rather to find
what general precept was intended to be provided by the legisla-
tion, not the legislators, to apply to factual situations of the gen-
eral nature of those giving rise to the dispute now before the
court.
Contrasting approaches towards ascertaining the intended
meaning and application of legislation with regard to a partic-
ular conflict of interest have sometimes been characterized re-
spectively as the "subjective" and the "objective" methods of
interpretation. 8 By the former, the statutory intent is deter-
mined by the purpose of the legislators in the light of the cir-
cumstances known at the time they adopted the rule. By the
latter, the meaning or the application is determined in the light
of the circumstances as they exist at the time the interpretation
takes place, perhaps many decades after the enactment. By the
objective method of interpretation (and specific examples will
be given below), the general social purpose of the law is the
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 235 (1953).
12. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for
State and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 362-64, 555-56 (1943). Professor Morrow
notes that Dean Pound, almost alone of the great thinkers in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, has been interested in this problem of the relativity of legal precept
insofar as excluding judicial discretion or not, a relativity which may vary accord-
ing to the field of law and the social purpose of the rule involved. See, e.g.,
Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L.
REV. 475 (1933).
13. See Guttridge, A Comparative View of the Interpretation of Statutes, 8
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1933), for discussion regarding the subject of this paragraph.
[Vol. XXII
LOUISIANA AND THE CIVIL LAW
guide to the intention of the legislators with regard to the appli-
cation of the legislative precept then before the court, and the
law is regarded as intended as regulation not only of factual sit-
uations known to the legislators at the time of enactment, but
also of generically similar factual situations to arise in the fu-
ture.
Again, sometimes differences in general interpretative tech-
nique are also classified as either "functional" or "mechanical.' 14
By the functional approach, the application of a statute to the
present conflict of interests is determined by considering
whether the legal precept was intended to regulate that gen-
eral type of conflict of interests and by considering the purpose
for which the statute was enacted. On the other hand, using the
mechanical approach, the court applies the statute according to
its formal wording, without consideration of its intended social
purpose; the words and not the purpose of the statute are relied
upon as the guide to its application.
The objective and the functional methods of interpretation
place great emphasis upon applying the legislation so as to carry
out the general social purpose of the legislation. This calls for
consideration of the general policy reasons underlying the enact-
ment of the legal precept - the general purpose behind its enact-
ment to regulate in the abstract a certain conflict of interest, and
the practical or equitable reasons for this purpose. The partic-
ular conflict of interest now before the court is to be decided
more in accordance with these general policy considerations
which induced the legislation, rather than simply by logical de-
ductions from the wording - it being remembered that, for pur-
poses of this discussion, we have already agreed that the formal
wording itself has not definitively provided us with a rule by
which we may with satisfaction resolve the dispute before us.
Thus, discussing French legal thought utilizing a somewhat
similar approach, Dean Loussouarn of France stated:
"The Code had been drafted and adopted to reflect and sus-
tain the social and economic life of 1804, but as those condi-
tions changed the provisions of the Code gradually lost their
justification or appropriateness. The rules of the Code as
written and originally conceived sometimes made a mockery
14. See von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and in France,
22 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNrvERSIDAD DE PUERTo RIco 235 (1953) for dis-
cussion regarding the subject of this paragraph.
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of justice, but exegesis paralyzed the judge and prevented
him from adapting the texts to the current conditions of life.
Besides, problems non-existent and unforeseeable at the time
of the adoption of the Code multiplied at a constantly increas-
ing rate. Thus a new approach to the process of interpreting
and applying the law had to be found. French doctrine, led
by Francois G6ny, successfully urged the abandonment of ex-
clusive reliance on exegesis and the adoption of a method of
interpretation which places more freedom and responsibility
in the judge.
"The method of free scientific research, as G~ny called it,
does not ignore legislation where it clearly applies to the
question at issue, but seeks to reinterpret it so as to give it
an application which is consistent with the changed condi-
tions which it is now called upon to regulate. The original
intention of the legislature ceases to be controlling, and in-
stead the judge must seek to give the text that meaning
which the legislature would have enacted had it been acting
at the present rather than in the past."'15
Prudhomme v. Savant,16 decided by the Supreme Court in
1922, is an illustration of the difference between the objective
and the subjective methods of interpretation. The question at
issue involved the interpretation of the code provision that a
nuncupative testament by public act must be "written" by the
notary as it is dictated to him by the testator in the presence of
at least three witnesses. 17 The will in question had been typed
by the notary at the testator's dictation.
In its original opinion, the Supreme Court held the will to be
void because "written" by a typewriter instead of by hand, al-
though otherwise confected with full observance of all required
code formalities. An essential basis of its reasoning was that
the authors of the Code could not have intended to permit the
use of a typewriter, because typewriters had not been invented
in 1870 when the Louisiana Civil Code was revised and re-
enacted.
On rehearing, however, a majority of the court reached the
opposite conclusion and held that the will was valid, with three
15. Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and
Precedent in French Law, 18 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 235, 242-43 (1958).
16. 150 La. 256, 90 So. 640 (1922).
17. La. Civil Code art. 92 (1808) ; La. Civil Code art. 1571 (1825) ; LA. CIvIL
CODE art. 1578 (1870).
[Vol. XXII
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Justices dissenting. The final majority opinion reasoned, cor-
rectly in my opinion, that it was immaterial whether the notary
typed the will at the testator's dictation, rather than wrote it
by hand, for the other prescribed formalities of the will were
designed to assure that it correctly set forth the testator's in-
tention. Unlike an olographic testament, which must be in the
handwriting of the testator and in which the particular char-
acteristics of the handwriting have a function as proof that the
will is indeed the act of the testator, the mechanical method of
transcription of a nuncupative will by public act, whether by
typewriter or by hand, has no function with regard to the aim of
the statute, which in this regard only specifies that the will be
"dwritten."
While the legislators of 1870 may have known only of writ-
ing by hand and may not have even dreamed of typewriters, the
court regarded them as not intending that the enactment apply
only to the then present conditions. In interpreting the code ar-
ticle, the court looked to the functional purpose of the law, the
end it sought to serve, the social interest it sought to conserve
or regulate. The court did not restrict the code article to the
particular fact situations known to the legislators at the time it
was adopted; it assumed that the provision was enacted as a gen-
eral legislative regulation to be applicable to changed circum-
stances arising in the future, so long as it served the same gen-
eral aim and the same intended social purpose.
Perhaps another example will also illustrate these generaliza-
tions concerning the functional and objective methods of inter-
pretation of legislation by the courts.
In Mooney v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 8 the ques-
tion at issue was whether a motorist was contributorily negligent
in passing to the right another vehicle going in the same direc-
tion on a four-lane highway, since La. R.S. 32:233 (A) provides
that "the driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceed-
ing in the same direction shall pass at a safe distance to the left
thereof." (Emphasis added.)
Although under its terms the statute seemed applicable to all
state highways, it was enacted at a time when only two-lane
highways were in existence. Judge Ellis for the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the enactment did not apply to
18. 80 So.2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
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four-lane highways, such as that on which the accident occurred;
he pointed out that, if it did apply to the modern four- and eight-
lane highways which have been designed to facilitate the move-
ment of traffic, then slow-moving traffic in the left lanes, slow-
ing or stopping to turn left, for instance, would force all other
traffic in the other lanes proceeding in the same direction to
slow or stop, since under the enactment these other vehicles
would be unable to pass to the right of the slowed or stopped
vehicle in the inside left lane. In view of the unsound and im-
practical results ensuing if the statute were literally applied,
Judge Ellis concluded that the legislators had never intended
that this statute designed for two-lane highways should apply to
four-lane highways such as that involved, and the court held,
therefore, that the motorist's passing on the right on a four-lane
highway was not negligent.
Again in Sanders v. Hisaw,19 the court had occasion to con-
strue the statutory regulation requiring the driver of an over-
taking automobile to sound his horn before passing a vehicle pro-
ceeding in the same direction.2 0 The case again concerns a four-
lane highway, and the court again held that the statutory regu-
lation, designed to regulate passing and overtaking on the two-
lane highways in existence at the time of its enactment, was not
intended by the legislature to apply to modern multiple-laned
super highways, where no function would be served and only a
nuisance would result from the continuous sounding of horns by
the streams of traffic passing to the right and left of other traf-
fic in other lanes bound in the same direction.
Thus, in these last two instances, the courts held that the
statutory enactments did not apply to changed conditions of later
decades, because their original function and social purpose was
completely irrelevant to these changed conditions - it would pro-
duce absurd and unreasonable results to apply to four-lane high-
ways these traffic regulations, which were intended for two-lane
highways and useful in safeguarding the movement of traffic
upon them only, not upon the larger multiple-laned highways.
As Professor Calamandrei of Italy has observed, in demo-
cratic regimes the law is a product of the social needs of the so-
ciety represented by the legislators and "the judge is also part
of the society in which he lives, and when he interprets the law
19. 94 So.2d 486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied.
20. LA. R.S. 233(B) (1950).
[Vol. XXII
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in applying it to a specific case, he must draw inspiration from
the same sentiments of social utility on which the law is based; to
determine 'the intention of the legislator' one must understand
fully the significance and force of the law; this can be done only
by turning for inspiration to the same social or political sources
that inspired the legislator."'2 1
It may not be inappropriate to note that great caution must
be exercised in the use of this technique of interpreting legisla-
tion by correlating its social purpose with the current factual
circumstances. The judge must be careful not to confuse what
he thinks is the intended general purpose of the enactment with
what is merely his own conception of how the statute should have
been worded; he must not substitute a new law for that actually
enacted by the legislature; he must not ignore plain statutory
language not clearly inapplicable to the present decisional facts
just because he does not like the result reached if it is applied
literally, when that result is within the reasonable contemplation
of the legislation. The judge must think of himself as the legis-
lators' colleague, not as a super-legislator; sometimes he merely
echoes the legislative rule, sometimes he completes or extends it
so as to govern conflicts of interest within its scope but not spe-
cifically provided for; and even when the judge finds the formal
wording of the legislative rule does not furnish the legal prin-
ciple appropriate for decision of the instant case, he does so only
in the spirit of cooperation and of doing what he thinks is the
intention of the legislation, not in a spirit of opposition or
dissent.
It also must not be overlooked that there is a place for the
mechanical application of statutes, as well as for the functional
application of them. The former technique is to be utilized in
the preponderance of litigated instances, where the enactment in
question was reasonably intended to apply to the type of conflict
of interest at issue before the court -the latter technique pri-
marily to assure that the enactment is being applied in the same
sense and for the general purpose intended by the legislation.
Further, the functional approach does not ignore exegesis; al-
though exegesis may no longer furnish the sole process by which
the meaning of legislation is ascertained, it is useful in deter-
mining the application and purpose of the legislative text as
originally intended, from which the present rule of law may be
21. CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 662 (1956).
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educed to apply to different or new or unforeseen circumstances
now before the court, a rule which should be consonant with the
original social intention and practical purpose of the enactment.
Before concluding these generalizations concerning the inter-
pretation of statutory law, brief reference should be made to the
decision of cases not expressly covered by statutory enactment.
Civil Code Article 21 specifically provides: "In all civil matters,
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and
decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to
be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where
positive law is silent." By this blank check, the legislature spe-
cifically delegated to our courts the authority to fill in the inter-
stices of positive law not specifically regulated by legislation.
A detailed study by Professor Dainow shows that in the exer-
cise of this authority to decide the unprovided-for case the Lou-
isiana courts have followed civilian techniques of judicial inter-
pretation, including the application or extension of code concepts
to new fact situations by deduction or analogy.22 The approach
of the judge in deciding the unprovided-for case is not, however,
simply that of the logician; it is more akin to that of the legisla-
tor, for the judge attempts "to find a rule which the legislature
would have enacted had it foreseen the case. ' 23 Not logic alone,
then, but also policy considerations of what rule is best for the
community as a whole and of what rule provides the fairest solu-
tion of the present controversy motivate the reasoning of the
judge in formulating the rule to be used to decide the case for
which the legislature did not provide.
2 4
The development of our mineral law is an example frequent-
ly given of the application by the Louisiana courts of ancient
code concepts to changed economic and social conditions for
which the Code did not provide. The detailed legal regulation
of the complex rights arising out of mineral development rests
upon two basic analogies - that of mineral rights to the servi-
22. DAINoW, LA METHODE DEPuis LE CODE CIVIL DE 1804 AU POINT DE VUE
L'INTERPRETATION JUDICIAiRE LOUISIANA, TRAUVAUX DE LA SEMAINE INTERNA-
TIONALE DE DROIT (1950). The substance of this study is also contained in
Dainow, The Method of Legal Development Through Judicial Interpretation in
Louisiana and Puerto Rico, 22 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO
Rico 108 (1953).
23. Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and
Precedent in French Lawv, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 235, 243 (1958).
24. On another occasion, the present writer has discussed this question. See
Tate, "Policy" in Judicial Decisions, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 62 (1959).
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tude affecting land, and that of the oil and gas lease to the lease
of land. The code concepts of servitude and lease have been suc-
cessfully applied to determine the nature and effects of complex
mineral interests of a nature completely unimaginable to the
jurisconsults who prepared our own and the French Civil Codes
and to the ancient sources from which they drew.
Yet another example of the interpretation of a statute by the
courts so as to decide cases concerning which the legislation has
made no express provision is a court-made rule in the workmen's
compensation field. The compensation statute provides that
compensation shall be paid to disabled employees, but it does not
provide for the situation that sometimes arises where an em-
ployee's disability can be relieved by a simple, customary, and
non-dangerous surgical procedure. Although the statute is silent
in this regard, and although the courts recognize that they have
no power to compel an employee to submit to an operation, the
courts have applied a rule that compensation will be ordered
withheld when an employee unreasonably refuses to submit to
minor surgery which will remove his disability.2 5 The courts in-
terpreted the compensation statute in this manner upon the the-
ory that the legislature never intended for a disabled employee
to draw compensation indefinitely if his disability could be easily
ended by minor surgery without danger to himself; although in
a sense legislating, the courts regarded themselves as carrying
out the general intention of the legislation in a factual situation
not expressly regulated by it.
II. DOCTRINE
Another legal material used by the courts in finding the law
to apply to the facts in litigation is "doctrine." We are here in-
terested in this source of law only insofar as it is used in judicial
interpretation.
Doctrine to the civilian is the interpretation of law expressed
in legal writings by those learned in the law. As to it, Planiol
states: "[I]ts role is considerable; it gives orientation; it pre-
pares from afar many changes in legislation and in case law....
[By it,] scientific principles and juridic ideas are developed and
25. See, e.g., Sumrall v. J. C. Penney Co., 101 So.2d 758 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1958), aff'd, 239 La. 762, 120 So.2d 67 (1960) ; Borders v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co., 90 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied. See also
Blumer, Workmen's Compensation: Refusal of Surgical Treatment, 10 LOYOLA L.
REv. 212 (1961).
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come to dominate the thoughts of judges and of the legislator
himself. '26 He further comments that doctrinal interpretation
"is the freest of all because it is purely theoretical. It is also the
most prolific because it is developed leisurely. In its examination
it does not confine itself to an isolated case. It gives to its con-
cepts and its deductions the broadness of view, the logic and the
force of a synthesis. But it has no use other than to influence
court decisions. '2 7
Commentators on Louisiana law two or three decades ago
noted the relatively small part played by doctrine in the modern
development of Louisiana's law, chiefly because of the general
unavailability of civilian works of interpretation due to the lan-
guage barrier and also because of the relative paucity at the time
of Louisiana doctrinal works.2 8
In the last two decades, however, we have seen a great in-
crease in Louisiana doctrinal writings, as well as in their general
availability to the bench and bar as guides and aids in the inter-
pretation of law. The publication by our law schools of three
fine law journals provides a constant critique and evaluation
which work toward synthesis and understanding of our newer
legislation and judicial decisions in their relationship to estab-
lished general legal principle and to the law as a whole. We must
also note the splendid work of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
which since its founding in 1938 has encouraged a revival of
civilian thinking and theory - think of, for instance, the recent
translation of Planiol's Civil Law Treatise sponsored by it, and
this treatise's undoubted impact in influencing the courts in the
interpretation of Civil Code articles in the light of their purpose
and context within the entire code scheme of civil relationships.2 9
In my opinion, doctrine plays a more important part in the
Louisiana decisional process than we sometimes credit it. The
great treatises of Professors Daggett,30 McMahon, 8 1 and Malone32
and their other writings have played an important part in syn-
thesizing from the decided cases and other source of legal
26. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE) § 127 (1959).
27. Id. § 201.
28. See, e.g., authorities cited in notes 1 and 2 supra.
29. Dainow, The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana
Law for Comparative Study, 10 Am. J. CoMP. L. 175 (1961).
30. DAGGETT, LOUISIANA MINERAL RIGHTS (rev. ed. 1949).
31. MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE (1939).
32. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1951).
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thought the guiding principles of law in the fields of mineral
rights, procedure, and workmen's compensation, respectively.
These scholars' perspective of the field as a whole, their knowl-
edge and research into the background and purpose of the legal
principles, their evaluation of the decided cases in the light of
the latter, have not only described how the law has been applied
in the past, but have also furnished guidelines to interpretations
in the future, which have undoubtedly influenced the develop-
ment and application of the law in these fields by the courts.3 3
Even an individual law review commentary may sometimes
influence the subsequent interpretation and application by the
courts of a rule of law analyzed and discussed. A dramatic ex-
ample of this is furnished by the development and clarification
of the law furnished through an article in 1953 by Bailey Chaney,
a Baton Rouge lawyer, suggesting the proper use and availability
of the thirty-year boundary prescription in title actions.34 In a
section of the Civil Code regulating the fixing of boundaries, 5
a thirty-year prescription is provided by which one may acquire
the ownership of land outside his title, if it has been possessed
within visible bounds for the requisite period. 6 Mr. Chaney's
thesis was that this code method of acquiring title should be
available not only in boundary actions, but also in all other title
actions - that a person should not retain or lose his title to land
varying according to the procedural action in which his owner-
ship is disputed. This conclusion was so logical and so doctrinal-
ly sound that the courts at once adopted it, relying upon the law
review article in question.37 Further, specifically relying upon
33. To use another general example, Professor Dainow's and Professor Mor-
row's works on judicial interpretation in Louisiana and its functions in a'civilian
jurisdiction will undoubtedly aid other judges, as they have helped me, to a
clearer understanding of our functions and duties in interpretation, which will
assist us in applying legal precepts to controversies before us in the manner in-
tended by the philosophy and standards of our legal system. See, e.g., Dainow,
The Constitutional and Judicial Organization of France and Germany and some
Comparisons of the Civil Law and Common Law, Systems, 37 IND. L.J. 1
(1961) ; DAINOW, The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana
Law for Comparative Study, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 175 (1961) ; DAINOW, LA
METILoDE DEPUIS LE CODE CIVIL DE 1804 AU POINT DE VUE L'INTERPRETATION
JUDICIAIRE LOUISIANA, TRAVAUX DE LA SEMAINE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT
(Paris, 1950). See also Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, published as an intro-
duction to the 1961 edition of CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA xiii (Dainow ed. 1961) ;
Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for State
and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 537 (1943).
34. Chaney, Prescription under Article 852, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 582
(1953).
35. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 823-855 (1870).
36. Id. art. 852.
37. See jurisprudence from Sattler v. Pellichino, 71 So.2d 689 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1954) through Nelken v. Aldredge, 128 So.2d 843 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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its reasoning, the First Circuit Court of Appeal subsequently re-
fused to follow a long line of jurisprudence which had held that
a title acquired by ten year's acquisitive prescription could not
be pleaded in a boundary action A8 (This result, incidentally, is
now approved by the new Code of Civil Procedure of 1960, which
specifically overruled such prior jurisprudence and adopted the
sensible rule of the later decisions following the Chaney article,
namely, that all questions of title and ownership can be raised
in a boundary action3 9 as well as in a title action, thus avoiding
multiplicity of actions or the loss of valuable substantive rights
just because of the procedure used.)
In my judgment, the greater influence of doctrine instanced
in the last two decades foreshadows an even greater use of doc-
trine in the interpretative process in the future. This will be so
not alone because of the greater availability of substantial
amounts of Louisiana doctrinal works. The growth of our popu-
lation and the increasing complexity of our civilization have pro-
duced such a volume of case-decisional material and of statutes
and amendments thereto that the practitioner and judge, in the
press of disposing of the multiplying volume of legal problems
resulting, must of necessity turn to general works synthesizing
and evaluating decisions and statutes in their relationship to the
fundamental essence of the legal principles involved.
The tremendous increase in the volume of legislation in mod-
ern times alone makes such a synthesis necessary. The multitude
of various separately-considered enactments cannot be consistent
from particular to particular. Additionally, the new legislation
often reflects principles different from those expressed by older
statutes, so that the meaning of former legislation must often be
reinterpreted constantly in the light of the principles expressed
by the newer enactments.
The work of the law reviews, and this includes the student
notes and comments (written as they are under the supervision
of the faculty or leading members of the bar), are invaluable
aids in evaluating the background and context of decisions and
statutes and in supplying perspective as to their legal history and
legislative or social intent. Harassed by the demands of a crowd-
ed docket or a busy practice, the judge or practitioner does not
ordinarily have as much time as he would like to make an ex-
38. Collett v. Otis, 80 So.2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
39. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEmuaR art. 3693 (1960).
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haustive study of legal questions presented and of all related
and incidental materials; but in these law review treatments, if
the question fortunately has been considered in such a source,
this important and time-consuming research has normally been
done in detail and with correlation to general doctrine and theory
in the legal field involved, so as to serve as a very important
source of interpretation of the legal principle, whether or not
the conclusions suggested by the law source are adopted by the
court.
III. PRECEDENTS
In orthodox civilian fashion, we come last to consideration of
the place of precedents, that is, of the jurisprudence, in the Lou-
isiana decisional processes. This is misleading, because in actual
fact most Louisiana judges look for guidance in the interpreta-
tion of legal precepts first to the prior decisions of his own or
of other courts; most members of the bar, also, rely principally
upon the jurisprudence as a guide to the meaning of law, rather
than upon theoretical doctrine or upon their own processes of
sound reasoning regarding the application of a statute in the
light of its fundamental purpose.40 In other civilian jurisdictions
also, in modern times at any rate, the case law is a very impor-
tant source of the legal materials and legal reasoning used by
the judges in deciding litigation.41
However, as noted earlier, under pure civilian theory, the
sole source of law is statutory. The decisions of the courts are
not law, but merely persuasive interpretations of it.
Although in practice the use of precedents may often be ap-
proximately similar in civilian and in common law jurisdictions,
the essential difference lies in the attitude towards them and the
sanctity with which they are regarded. Formerly, at least, com-
mon law jurisdictions regarded even a single precedent as bind-
ing on the court which established it and on all lower courts
subject to its appellate jurisdiction, while even in modern times
an established precedent is regarded as law, law being what the
courts will do rather than some abstract principle independent
of judicial interpretation and applications. In a civilian juris-
diction, however, the precedent is regarded only as an interpre-
40. See, e.g., Pascal, A Report on the French Civil Code Revision Project, 25
TuL. L. REV. 205, 212-13 (1951).
41. Deftk, The Place of the "Case" in the Common and the Civil Law, 8 TuL.
L. REV. 337 (1934), as well as authorities cited at note 3 supra.
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tation of the law (i.e., of legislation) ; the precedent is not bind-
ing as having established a rule; it is rather valid insofar as per-
suasively demonstrating the correct interpretation of the statu-
tory source.
The civilian does not regard the judicial interpretations of a
statute as becoming part of the statute, so that the statute as
interpreted is the law. He regards the statute alone as being the
law, and prior decisions do not "insulate" him, in Professor Mor-
row's happy phrasing,42 from going directly to the statute for its
meaning. In ideal theory, the civilian judge decides cases pri-
marily "not by reference to other decisions, but by reference to
legislative texts and within the limits of such judicial discretion
as the legislative texts grant. '43
In some important respects, Louisiana has adopted the civil-
ian concept of case law. Thus (although two to three decades
ago this was controverted) ,44 there is now substantial agreement
among scholars that the common law doctrine of stare decisis
does not apply in Louisiana, although on the other hand prece-
dents are still of importance because of the civilian doctrine of
jurisprudence constamnte which our courts do follow. 45
As summarized in 1937 by members of the Louisiana State
University law faculty during a famous scholastic dispute con-
cerning whether Louisiana had abandoned its civil law heritage:
"The two most important differences, then, between the doc-
trine of jurisprudence constante and the rule of stare decisis,
are: (1) a single case affords a sufficient foundation for the
latter, while a series of adjudicated cases all in accord forms
the predicate of the former; and (2) case law in civilian
jurisdictions is merely law de facto, while under the common
law technique it is law de lure. A third characteristic differ-
ence between the two doctrines of judicial precedent is that
under the common law technique an inferior court must fol-
low the case law announced by a superior court; under the
civilian technique, in strict theory, they are not obliged to and
occasionally do not, although for practical reasons, such as
42. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for
State and National, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 537, 546 (1943).
43. Morrow, An Approach to the Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 10
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 59, 64 (1949).
44. Comment, Stare Decisis in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 100 (1932) ; and
authorities cited at note 1 supra.
45. See authorities cited at note 2 supra.
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fear of reversal, inferior courts ordinarily follow the juris-
prudence of superior courts."46
Some twenty years later, the civilians triumphant, Colonel
John H. Tucker, President of the Louisiana Law Institute and a
leader in the civilian renaissance, reiterated with approval their
conclusion:
"'We [in Louisiana] have never adopted stare decisis, and
whatever chances it had of creeping into our system have
been reduced to the vanishing point by the passage of time.
Our courts have always followed, and show every disposition
to continue to follow, the essential civilian judicial technique
of never letting today become either the slave of yesterday
or the tyrant of tomorrow.' -47
Some idea of the less reverent attitude of Louisiana courts
towards precedents than that of courts in common law jurisdic-
tions is evidenced by the 1937 study of these scholars, showing
that the Louisiana Supreme Court had overruled its own prior
decisions seventy-six times during the preceding twenty-five
year period, and that on several occasions the lower courts re-
fused to follow Supreme Court decisions which they felt to be
erroneous.
48
Selected at random are several other, more recent, instances:
In 1957, for example, a Louisiana court of appeal ref used to fol-
low a line of many decisions, including three by the State Su-
preme Court (one of which had only recently reaffirmed the
rule), which held that an in forma pauperis plaintiff (who is
46. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert & MeMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief
for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 17 (1937). The 1937 dispute
and the leading articles involved are briefly summarized in Brosman, A Contro-
versy and a Challenge, 12 TUL. L. REV. 239 (1938). The orthodox civilian theory
regarding precedents is stated as follows in 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
(TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 204 (1959):
"Judicial interpretation is free in principle. Every tribunal may adopt the solu-
tion which it considers the most just and the best. It is bound neither by deci-
sions which it may have handed down previously in analogous cases nor by those
of a higher court." Because of the binding effect commonly accorded higher
court decisions by lower tribunals in Louisiana (see Subsection C in text infra),
it would appear to me that the theoretical effect of precedent in our jurisprudence
is probably more in accord with the Spanish doctrina legal than with the French
jurisprudence constante, according to the explanation of the former contained in
Dean Ramos' review of Herzog, Le Droit Jurisprudentiel et le Tribunal Supreme
en Espagne, 22 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 442 (1953).
47. Tucker, The Code and the Common Law in Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV.
739, 759 (1955).
48. See Daggett, Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A
Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 22, 23 (1937).
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statutorily privileged to file suit without pre-payment or bonding
of court costs) was not liable for court costs if he lost the suit;
there was an express statutory provision apparently overlooked
by these prior decisions, and the court of appeal applied it rather
than the precedents following a contrary rule; on certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed, acknowledging the error in the juris-
prudence created by its own decisions. 49 In Collett v. Otis
(1955),5° the First Circuit refused to follow a long line of juris-
prudence based upon several Supreme Court opinions, by which
a title prescription could not be pleaded in a boundary action;
the First Circuit found that the illogical and impractical rule had
been first announced as dictum only and then blindly followed
without serious consideration of its unsoundness in code doc-
trine and in policy."' In Washington v. Washington (1959),52
the First Circuit refused to follow its own precedent and applied
instead the contrary holding of another intermediate appellate
court as to the same question, on the ground that the latter was
better reasoned and more in accord with the intent of the code
articles involved, also citing Planiol.
Theoretically, then, since the statutory basis is the sole source
of law, the prior decisions, being merely interpretations of it,
may be disregarded whenever the present court is convinced that
the precedents are erroneous, however numerous and however
ancient or recent.
In the actual working of the Louisiana legal system, however,
lawyers and laymen rightly regard an interpretation represented
by a line of several decisions as establishing a settled application
of the law which the courts will with reasonable certainty follow
in the future if litigation concerning the same question again
arises. While reference is or should be made first to the statu-
tory law, in actual practice the interpretation reflected by the
case decisions, the law in action so to speak, is almost always
heavily relied upon, with the usually correct assumption that the
legal precept in question will be applied to the present facts as
it was in the past and that the meaning of the precept is demon-
strated by these indicative and illustrative court decisions. "The
49. Coulon v. Anthony Hamlin, Inc., 93 So.2d 557 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955),
aff'd, 233 La. 798, 98 So.2d 193 (1957).
50. 80 So.2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
51. See also text at note 38 supra.
52. 116 So.2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), affirmed as to issue involved,
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jurisprudence is the legislation itself as it appears in the light
of the judicial decisions."53
For, in actual practice, Louisiana judges do not lightly dis-
regard a settled line of precedents, even though in theory they
are free to do so.
This is so for several reasons. First, fidelity to the institu-
tion of an ordered legal system, which we will discuss more fully
below, demands general stability of legal rules. For this reason,
in the absence of manifest unfairness or illogic, there is a ten-
dency among judges not to disregard previous adjudications on
the same question, even when the judge himself believes that a
better-reasoned interpretation of the rule would provide a dif-
ferent application, one which he himself would have recommend-
ed had the question been presented to him first, before the other
adjudications.
Second, the basis of a court decision is legal reasoning found-
ed upon certain legislative precepts, and it is quite probable that
the next court to which a question of law is presented will reach
the same conclusion as did the courts which decided it earlier,
since more likely than not the earlier reasoning was also sound.
Third, the concept that courts as a general rule will exhaus-
tively re-examine legal rules or standards well accepted by prior
decisions overlooks the tendency towards economy of effort re-
quired in this day of crowded dockets and ever-increasing litiga-
tion. Without a vast expansion in staff and a radical change in
human nature, the courts simply do not have the time or inclina-
tion to re-test and re-formulate settled applications of legal prin-
ciples in every instance of litigation, particularly since the set-
tled general rule is almost always fair and practical (even though
sometimes in theory a better one might be devised). In the ab-
sence of a belief that the application of the general rule sanc-
tioned by several prior decisions produces unjust results, the
court will almost always therefore determine only whether the
general rule has been correctly applied to the present case, rather
than also re-examine its validity.
241 La. 35, 127 So.2d 491 (1961). See also Dainow, The Planiol Treatise on the
Civil Law: French and Louisiana Law for Comparative Study, 10 Am. J. COMP. L.
175, 182-83 (1961).
53. Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine,
and Precedent in French Law, 18 LOUISLANA LAw REviEw 235, 257 (1958).
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These reasons for the general 'stability 'of precedent have
touched upon an underlying fundamental purpose of any legal
system: to establish a certainty of legal rule, and a predictability
of outcome in its application in the event of litigation, upon
which men regulated by that system of laws can rely in their
everyday dealings. The rule of order and the relative security of
human rights so established are regarded as a fundamental
necessity of a civilized social system. Competing with this de-
mand for certainty of legal rule, however, is often the need for
some flexibility, so that the rule may be accommodated to chang-
ing conditions and yet still serve the same basic social purpose
as originally intended, and so that when applied to changed cir-
cumstances it will not produce unfair results contrary to those
intended by the legislation.
The competing needs for stability and flexibility are of vary-
ing relative importance depending upon the nature of the legal
relationship involved. For instance, it is usually pointed out
that the stability of land titles requires inflexible and unchanging
rules and firm adherence to precedent, because many property
rights are acquired in reliance thereupon. On the other hand, it
is usually agreed that more flexibility is permitted in tort law,
since there the legal precepts revolve about reasonable standards
of conduct, which themselves are evolving and changing as the
circumstances of the society which spawns them change. In this
regard, a distinction should therefore be made between areas of
law (1) in which consistency of interpretations is necessary be-
cause people act deliberately in reliance upon them (contract,
property, security agreements, prescriptive periods, etc.) and
those (2) in which consistency is not as necessary because the
interpretations of the law previously given have not been a guide
for action (most questions of "negligence" or "fault," unjust
enrichment cases, the application of separation and divorce laws,
etc.).
Thus, deciding a given legal question may involve considera-
tions other than pure logic and the intellectually ideal resolution.
In the event of conflict between such ideally right solution and a
different and less logical rule previously applied by the prece-
dents, against applying the ideal rule must be balanced consid-
erations of the need for order and stability in the legal system.
Then, in addition, the relative fairness of the ideal as compared
with the precedential result must be balanced. Finally, in this
[Vol. XXII
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process of balancing competing policy, ideas, consideration, must
also be given to the relative social importance of either stability
or individualization of result in the application of the rule in
the field of law in question.
In practice, these generalized considerations concerning pol-
icy reasons either to follow or else to overrule or ignore prece-
dent are rarely utilized or articulated in deciding a given case.
Almost always the technique of decision requires no considera-
tion of whether a settled rule should be followed or not, but only
involves the application of the settled rule to the present facts,
after having selected the settled rule intended to govern them.
Of course, the rule of interpretation established by precedent is
not applied blindly; as Professor Llewellyn noted, the guiding
principle in applying it is that "the rule follows where its reason
leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule. ' '54
The following are some of the practical situations in which
the place and use of precedent may present a problem. We will
assume in each instance that prior precedent supports a legal
precept which the court does not wish to follow, in the belief
that a different precept formulated by it Will supply a more just
result and one more in accordance with the intention of the legis-
lation upon which both precepts are based.
A. When the precedent is the decision of a court of coordi-
nate or subordinate or another jurisdiction: In this instance,
there is general agreement that the precedent of the other court
of coordinate jurisdiction is merely persuasive and may be dis-
regarded without compunction if the court feels that its own pre-
cept is better or more logical.5 5 Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme
Court regards as merely persuasive the application of a precept
established by a line of lower appellate court precedents, and it
freely reaches a conclusion overruling such decisions if in the
judgment of the higher court another interpretation is more cor-
rect.56 Likewise, holdings of federal courts and those of other
jurisdictions on questions of law are merely persuasive and will
not necessarily be followed by a Louisiana court in the determi-
nation of questions involving state law. 57
54. LLEWELLYN, Tiir BRAMBLE Busn 157-58 (rev. ed. 1961).
55. See, e.g., Ellis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 So. 780 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960),
aff'd, 241 La. 433, 129 So.2d 729 (1961) ; Shreveport v. Baylock, 236 La. 133,
107'So.2d 419 (1958).
56. See, e.g., Duree v. Maryland Cas..Co., 238 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594 (1959).
57. See, e.g., flinches v. Long Bell Petroleum Co., 235 La. 185, 103 S0.2d 84
(1958).
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B. When the precedent is the decision of a higher court: In
theory, a civilian court is not bound by precedents even of higher
courts and may go directly to the statutory source and reach its
own independent conclusion as to the meaning and application
of the legal precept in question.5" In actual practice, however,
lower courts in Louisiana almost invariably feel bound to follow
jurisprudence established by a higher court. This usual attitude
was stated most forcefully recently in State v. Cenxc,59 a 1961
decision of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit:
"It is too clear to admit of argument that one of the primary
functions of a superior court whether acting under its direct
appellate or supervisory jurisdiction via writ is to enumerate
definitive interpretations of law binding upon and controll-
ing subsequent decisions of all courts inferior thereto. It is
an elementary, basic principle of law that inferior courts are
bound by the decisions of superior supervisory tribunals."
In addition to legal reasons sometimes advanced based upon
the constitutional power of the State Supreme Court to control
inferior courts,60 a practical reason why courts of appeal adhere
to this rule is because they do not wish to cause unnecessary ex-
pense and delay to the litigants by rendering a judgment which
will certainly be reversed. Implicit in this practical reason is
loyalty to the concept of a rule of order within the legal system
(to be evidenced by accepting the high court's ruling until it
reverses itself) and also a feeling that such a policy produces
the more efficient administration of the judicial system as a
whole and that a contrary policy invites public disrespect of the
courts.
For the same reasons which oblige a court of appeal to fol-
low a Supreme Court ruling with which it disagrees, a district
court will usually in a similar situation follow a ruling of the
court of appeal with appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Of course, there are many instances where, by considering
the underlying reasons for a holding of law by the higher court,
the lower court may discover that the seemingly applicable hold-
ing was not intended to apply to the legal conflict now before it.
That is, a lower court is not required to apply mechanically
58. See note 46 supra.
59. 132 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 132 So.2d 928 (La.
1961).
60. See State v. Cenac, 132 So.2d 897-98 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
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precedents of higher courts which were never intended to supply
a principle for the distinguishable type of conflict now before
the lower court. Occasionally also, as noted above, 61 a lower court
will refuse to apply a higher court ruling when the latter has it-
self failed to apply or overlooked some controlling statutory en-
actment or is based on mere unconsidered dictum; the lower
court acts then with reasonable certainty that the higher court
will overrule itself when the controlling legislative principle is
called to its attention.
No matter what the practice, it may be asked, what is the
moral duty of a lower judge when he is absolutely convinced
that the precept or interpretation announced by the higher court
by a controlling and non-distinguishable precedent is unques-
tionably wrong, so that the higher court will surely reverse itself
if presented squarely with the compelling reasons which have
convinced the lower judge that the previous decision is wrong?
I am aware that, according to the true civilian philosophy of
the function of judicial interpretation, a lower court should ren-
der the judgment it thinks is correct and just, regardless of an
erroneous prior decision of a higher court. I am also aware that,
by doing so, it will at least force the higher court to a thorough
reconsideration of its prior position by requiring its review by
formal written opinion of its previous precedent concerning the
question.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, Louisiana judges, including me,
will feel morally bound to honor a higher court precedent con-
taining a considered holding squarely and clearly applicable to
the conflict before us. We do so not only for the same general
considerations of policy stated just above, in accordance with
the tradition in Louisiana of respecting higher court determina-
tions, but also because with some humility we must recognize
that, no matter how obvious the error of the precedent seems to
us, we may well be wrong, since judges of the higher court at
least equally conscientious as ourselves have reached a different
conclusion.
But (although there may be some disagreement among
judges as to this) I do not feel that the lower court judge is pre-
vented by the ethics of his craft from indicating why he feels
that the higher court precedent, which he feels bound to follow,
61. See text at notes 48-51 supra.
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is nevertheless, erroneous and why a more sound interpretation
of the statutory source justifies a different rule, and from invit-
ing the higher court to reconsider its previous interpretation of
law. 2 Further, in those rare instances when a Louisiana court
of appeal is uncertain that the previous Supreme Court holding
of law is correct and when the lower court also seriously ques-
tions that the ruling will be followed if that higher tribunal re-
considers the question, the court of appeal has the little-used
constitutional authority to certify to the Supreme Court "any
question of law arising in any cause pending before it concern-
ing which, for its proper decision, it desires the instruction of
that court.' '63
C. When the Precedent is a Decision of the Same Court:
Without reiterating all the policy considerations expressed in
the generalizations above, for those reasons the court will with
hesitancy overrule the application of a rule settled by a course
of its own considered decisions. However, when convinced of
error in a single or an ancient precedent upon which no prop-
erty rights are founded, the court will freely overrule its own
earlier precedent; and, when the legal or practical or equitable
reasons for a different application of the rule were not consid-
ered in or available for the deciding of a course of earlier prece-
dents, the court will overrule its prior decisions when convinced
they do not provide the just rule and where no property rights
have been acquired in reliance upon them.
64
Sometimes this situation is presented: A settled application
of a rule by a court is now seen by it to be clearly wrong, for
reasons not previously considered or because of subsequent de-
velopments in the jurisprudence. Nevertheless, although the
court desires to change the application of the rule in order to
provide a sounder one, one of the litigants in the case now before
the court has acted in reliance upon the former construction of
the rule, and it does not seem fair that he should be penalized
62. See, e.g., the writer's concurring opinions recently in Romero v. Leger,
133 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) and Rycade Oil Corp. v. Board of Com-
missioners for Atchafalaya Basin, 129 So.2d 302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). In
both of these instances the Supreme Court denied writs of review, indicating an
additional explanation why the writer believes there are sound reasons for a lower
court judge to balance against his positive conviction that the higher court
precedent was erroneous, the circumstance that the higher court judges may with
equal conviction and perhaps equal reason have reached the opposite conclusion.
63. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 25.
64. See text at notes 48-51 aupra.
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when his course of conduct was based upon the court's former
interpretations of the rule.
What shall the court do then? In the interest of providing a
more sound and fair general rule for the future, shall it overrule
its prior precedent, despite the individual unfairness that will
result to the litigant in this particular case? Contrariwise, in
the interests of individual fairness to the litigant who has relied
upon the former precedents, shall the court perpetuate an in-
terpretation which produces unsound and unfair results gen-
erally?
Yet a third approach is available, referred to as the use of
the "Sunburst doctrine," so-called after the title of a 1932 United
States Supreme Court decision 5 which refused to interfere with
the use of this technique by the Montana Supreme Court. By this
approach, the court applies its old rule to the case now before it,
but announces that in cases arising subsequent to the decision
the new and sounder rule enunciated therein will be applied. The
new precedent thus established is given prospective effect only;
it is applicable only to causes arising after its decision, while
the overruled former precedent still applies to causes of action
arising before the new decision. Sometimes questioned by the
purist as demonstrating too bald a display of legislative function
by a court, this technique is nevertheless used sometimes as the
most sensible and fair method of resolving the dilemma above
described, where a court must either accomplish temporary in-
dividual unfairness or else perpetuate an unsound interpretation
which will adversely affect others in the future.0 6
Incidentally, one of the earliest instances of the use of this
technique by an American court is the 1888 Louisiana decision
in Levy v. Nitsche67 It is of some further interest that in
the 1960 decision of Sumrall v. J. C. Penney Co.', our Supreme
Court most recently utilized a technique of this nature. Al-
though under strict civilian theory the law provided by the
legislation and now at last correctly interpreted by the later de-
cisions, had always governed the type of conduct in question,
65. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
66. See Comment, Retrospective Effect of an Overruling Decision, 7 LoIiSIANA
LAw REvIEw 133 (1946), for a discussion of the "Sunburst doctrine." See also
Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
67. 40 La. Ann. 500, 4 So. 472 (1888). This case is reported in 40 La. Ann.
500 as Levy v. Hitsche.
68. 239 La. 762, 120 So.2d 67 (1960).
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both before and after the court's corrected interpretation of it,
equity and practical considerations support the court's conclu-
sion that the litigant should not be penalized for relying upon
the prior precedents of the courts, even though it is now seen
that they were erroneous interpretations of the law.
CONCLUSION
In this sketch of techniques used by a Louisiana judge to
find the law with which to decide a particular case before him,
we have only glancingly mentioned the fundamental aim of the
judge in deciding the case - to decide it fairly. After all, a con-
scientious judge is usually not trying to find the answer to an
abstract legal conundrum; he is trying to do justice, to reach a
fair and reasonable solution of a conflict between the interests
of human beings.
Chief Justice Udall of Arizona once stated, "The duty of all
judges is to see that justice is done within the framework of the
law in all cases that come before us."' 9 It is important to note,
however, the qualification - that a judge must strive to see that
justice is done, but "within the framework of the law."
When the legal rule is certain and its application to the type
of conflict before the court was certainly intended, then the func-
tion of the judge is more or less to apply mechanically the legal
precept in question. In these instances, comprising the vast pre-
ponderance of litigation, one can see clearly that the essential
function of the judge is not to make law, but to apply it. In such
instances, it is easier to conceive of the judge as some sort of a
computer, although not as accurate and perfect to be sure as a
real one: The type of human conduct involved in the litigation
is fed into the computer, it matches the conduct with the appro-
priate legal precept designed to govern this type of conduct, and
out comes the correct answer.
But, as we have seen, the legal problem is not always that
simple, and the meaning or the application of the law may not
be clear and may admit of judicial discretion in interpretation.
A great international jurist once commented, "the judge is not
actually a mechanism, a calculating machine. He is a living man,
and the function of determining the law and applying it in a con-
69. Udall, The Essential Characteristics of a Judge, 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 69
(1957).
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crete instance, which in theory can be represented as a syllogism,
is in reality a synthetic operation that mysteriously takes place
in the sealed crucible of the spirit, where intuition and sentiment
[for a fair disposition of the dispute] must be heated in an active
conscience to solder together the abstract law and the concrete
fact" 70 - in order, in sum, to produce a just result.
We must view rules of construction, techniques of interpre-
tation, methods of development of the law, all as serving this
great fundamental aim of the judge - "To see that justice is
done" but, to reiterate, "within the framework of the law" pro-
vided by the legislators, to whom the people in a democratic
society have entrusted the law-making function.
70. CALAMANDRIE, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 30-31 (1956).
